This paper seeks to examine whether Malaysia is facing negative deindustrialization by examining value-added, trade and productivity trends over the period [1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005]. The evidence produced in the paper is concrete enough to confirm that Malaysia is facing negative deindustrialization. While it is typical, as part of the process of structural change, to see a rise and fall in the share occupied by manufacturing in the GDP, the evidence shows that Malaysia is indeed facing premature deindustrialization with a trend slowdown in manufacturing value-added, trade performance and productivity since 2000. Not only has the trade performance of manufacturing been falling, manufacturing labour productivity has also slowed down, with the key sectors such as electric-electronics, textiles and transport equipment showing either negative or low productivity growth since 2000. Malaysian industrial policies have been fairly successful in connecting with the global value chains of multinationals and in developing resource-based industries, but have not achieved the same success in stimulating their transformation to high value-added activities. The lack of effective institutional change, partly explained by ethnic policies, is advanced as the prime reason for the setting in of negative deindustrialization in Malaysia.
Introduction

G
alvanized by the launching of export processing zones, from 1972 onwards the manufacturing sector grew rapidly to become an increasingly important contributor to Malaysia's GDP until 2000. 2 In the 1970s, giant multinational corporations from the developed economies helped make Malaysia a major exporter of electric-electronics goods and, since the 1980s, also from Asia's four little tigers (i.e., Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan). The textile and clothing industries were also important contributors to manufactured export expansion until the 1990s. In addition, the manufacturing industry undertook huge forays into import-substitution industrialization from 1981 onward as steel, transport equipment and cement manufacturing enjoyed strong protection, subsidies and government capitalization. 3 Transport equipment has continued to enjoy strong government support since the implementation of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) under the ASEAN 4 Free Trade Area (AFTA), signed on January 28, 1992 in Singapore.
Massive inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the manufacturing sector not only helped drive rapid expansion but also caused serious tightening of the labour market by the mid-1990s. 5 The focus of industrial policy since shifted towards industrial deepening as the government attempted to take advantage of low unemployment levels, down to 2.7 percent in 1995. The Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development (APITD) of 1990 helped provide the groundwork for the opening of the Human Resource Development Fund (HRDF), Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), the Malaysia Industry Government High Technology (MIGHT), the cluster-based Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP 2 ), the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) and the Multimedia Development Corporation (MDEC) in the 1990s to support technological deepening. 6 The Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Systems (MIMOS) was also corporatized in the 1990s. Unfortunately, a combination of poor coordination and the lack of performance standards reduced the effectiveness of these instruments to stimulate value addition in the manufacturing sector. Hence, firms approached the government to import foreign labour to sustain their operations, which further aggravated the situation by reducing the pressure to upgrade technology. The government's focus on unskilled labour in the 1980s and the 1990s undermined firm-level initiatives to upgrade. These developments led a number of authors to warn that the Malaysian industrialization project may have stalled. 7 This paper seeks to provide evidence that Malaysia has been facing negative deindustrialization since the turn of the millennium. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a theoretical guide to explain why governments such as Malaysia have attached so much focus on supporting manufacturing growth. Section 3 analyzes the composition of GDP, and the growth of manufacturing, trade and productivity trends in Malaysia's manufacturing sector. In doing so the paper uses considerable raw data compiled from the Statistics Department of Malaysia and some interviews by the author. The final section presents the conclusions and policy implications.
Theoretical Considerations
The arguments on industrialization as the engine of growth and development arose largely from the advocates of industrial policy. Smith 8 and Young 9 articulated the arguments incisively to show why industrialization is essential to drive increasing returns activities in particular economies. Gerschenkron, 10 Chang 11 and Reinert 12 provided systematic historical evidence to argue that all successful industrializers have used industrial policy, either consciously or unconsciously, in order to to develop. 13 Young 14 pointed out that its differentiation capacity offers manufacturing the opportunity to generate the increasing returns essential to supporting economic progress. Kaldor 15 used the Verdoorn relationship to argue that manufacturing possessed increasing returns properties and hence enjoyed the greatest potential for supporting rapid economic growth. Using two econometric equations Kaldor demonstrated that manufacturing enjoyed a positive and strong elasticity of change with GDP. Although statistical problems with Kaldor's growth equations have long been acknowledged 16 the increasing returns properties of manufacturing has remained the key towards rapid growth and structural change in heterodox arguments. 17 Rowthorn and Wells argued that the shift towards services has been accompanied by continued improvements in productivity in a number of industries in the United States (positive deindustrialization) while it has declined in the United Kingdom (negative deindustrialization). 18 What is obvious here is that deindustrialization occurs when the share of value-added of industry in general and manufacturing in particular in GDP shows a trend fall. Kaldor included construction and utilities in industry as appendages of manufacturing.
19 Deindustrialization is considered positive if manufacturing's productivity and trade performance remains strong while it is considered negative if it starts to show a trend fall. Since construction and utilities are typically nontradables, assessments of the type of deindustrialization is largely confined to manufacturing. In addition, negative deindustrialization is not only associated with a stagnation or fall in value-added output and productivity, but is also characterized by a lack of structural shift from low value-added labour-intensive to high valueadded capital-and knowledge-intensive industries in manufacturing.
Industrialization-both the growth in share of GDP and its diversification into higher value-added activities-have been associated with the successful development of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the initial years of rapid growth. Similarly, East and Southeast Asia's successful developers-i.e., the flying geese stock of Japan, Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan-enjoyed rapid industrialization throughout their high growth years.
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Attempts to discuss the importance of industrialization will not be complete without a discussion of the trade and the structural orientation of industries that should be promoted. Advocates of industrial development in the 1950s recommended a focus on heavy and capital goods industries (department two goods) as an integral part necessary to produce final consumption goods (department one goods) manufacturing. Advocates of this approach argue that the department two goods that constitute machinery and equipment were critical complementary inputs for the development of other industries. 21 Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan very much enjoyed the development of both light manufacturing and complementary heavy industries, thereby making them versatile in entering a wide range of final goods industries. Yet, light manufacturing goods such as textiles and garments also grew rapidly in these countries. Apart from Britain, which de-industrialized rapidly by the 1970s, the other countries above are also at the forefront in the manufacture of electronics devices.
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The focus on heavy industries behind import-substitution, in both large and small domestic markets, failed in many countries because of a combination of a lack of scale and crony approaches that removed competitive pressures to drive firm-level technological catch-up. Poorly coordinated and corrupt import-substitution policies failed in Latin America 23 and the Philippines. 24 The manufacturing sector in Malaysia largely developed under the aegis of foreign capital with increased integration into the capitalist world economy. 25 Industrial policy instruments targeted at driving a technological catch-up in the heavy industries of automobiles and steel either have not generated the desired results or have failed. 26 However, the Republic of Korea achieved competitiveness in the heavy industries of steel, shipbuilding and cars, and machinery and steel by using import-substitution for export promotion, 27 while Taiwan managed it in machinery and metals, and electronics 28 through deliberate learning and innovation strategies and performance standards. Governments in these countries enjoyed autonomy from clientelist groups and were able to enforce stringent conditions on the manufacturers. 29 Hence, it can be argued that the strategic industrial policy as seen in the Northeast Asian models has been successful. The Republic of Korea and Taiwan have also experienced a contraction in the contribution to GDP with a trend expansion in services, but manufacturing productivity has continued to rise. Hence, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan have experienced positive deindustrialization.
Malaysian Industrialization
For deindustrialization to show a positive trend not only should there be rising value-added in output and productivity increase, there should also be a structural shift from low value-added labour-intensive to high value-added capital-and knowledge-intensive industries in manufacturing. Four major developments are important for the discussion in this paper. First, manufacturing became the most important contributor to GDP by the 1990s but since 2000 has started to show signs of contraction. Second, the springboard of manufacturing growth, i.e., the light export-oriented electricelectronics and textile-garment industries, has faced a contraction over the period 2000 to 2008. Third, the import-substituting automobile industry that was promoted through heavy protection from 1981 onward has also begun contracting. Fourth, the key manufacturing industries have plateaued without managing to show tangible signs of deepening in export markets. This section relies on growth rates, changes in GDP shares, trade performance and productivity to examine the state of industrialization in Malaysia.
Expansion and Slowdown
The contribution of industry as a whole to the GDP, which includes manufacturing, construction and utilities, grew from 30.7 percent in 1990 to reach its peak of 37.9 percent in 2000 before falling to 32. (see table 2 ). All the service sectors recorded much higher growth rates over the period 2005-09. Transport and communications, financial services and public administration had already started growing more swiftly than manufacturing since 2000. Because the intersectoral dynamics of structural change have not evolved sufficiently well the expansion in services is unlikely to produce the synergies required to make its role dynamic. For services to generate dynamic economic synergies, the organizations supporting R&D, education and training, and logistics coordination must be upgraded. A case in point is the expansion of services to account for 71 percent of Taiwan's GDP in 2008, where the manufacturing sector has evolved to a position of global leadership technologically, with strong linkages with the other sectors so that it continues to synergize GDP growth.
The share of value-added in gross output of the manufacturing sector fluctuated from 26.2 percent in 1992 to 26.6 percent in 1997 before falling to 18.0 percent in 2005 (see figure 1). Although this share has risen again gradually to 19.2 percent in 2008 it does not appear significant enough to suggest an upward trend. In addition, using cross-country comparisons, Malaysia's value-added share in gross output of 18.3 percent was significantly Table 3 
Trade Performance
This sub-section looks at the trade performance of manufacturing to examine if Malaysian manufacturing is experiencing a structural shift to higher valueadded activities. The indices studied are trade balance, imports in domestic demand, export intensity of output and the shares of exports in overall exports.
The trade balance (TB) index denotes the relative significance of exports against imports and the estimations are shown in table 4. The TB index varies between -1 and 1 with negative balances denoting that imports exceed exports. It can be seen that food and beverage, wood and petroleum and coal products have enjoyed the highest trade balances over the period 1990 equipment (see table 5 ). The rising import-intensity of domestic demand over the period 2000 to 2005 reflects a squeezing out of domestic production by imports. Import shares of textiles, chemicals, rubber and plastics, basic metals and professional and scientific equipment showed a rise from 1995. Only the resource-based industries of wood, petroleum and coal and chemicals show a trend fall in imports in domestic demand suggesting that Malaysian manufacturing is gradually becoming resource-intensive. The results suggest that domestic capabilities have developed more in resource-based industries enjoying natural endowments in the country. However, given that these industries are dependent on finite nonrenewable resources, the government will have to gradually reduce overdependence on these industries. A sustained long-term strategy of industrial deepening cannot be built on these industries. The foreign-capital led machinery (including electronics) and professional and scientific equipment are characterized by high import-intensities because of the domination of lowend labour-intensive activities. Only a handful of firms were engaged in designing and wafer fabrication activities in 2008.
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The export-intensity of output of manufacturing industries showed a mixed trend over the period 1990 to 2008 (see table 6 ). The most export-intensive manufacturing industries in 2008 were professional and scientific equipment (94.8 percent), machinery (including electronics) (93.1 percent) and textiles (84.3 percent). The least export-intensive manufacturing industries in 2008 were food and beverages (12.3 percent), non-metal minerals (11.7 percent), basic metals (17.8 percent) and transport equipment (23.7 percent). The transport equipment industry is still protected in Malaysia.
Export shares in output of food products, and petroleum and coal fell in trend terms over the period 1990 to 2008. Export shares in output of textiles and garments in trend terms rose over the period 1995 to 2008 as firms began to use cheaper foreign labour to compete in low-end products. 35 Rasiah 36 had argued over the deleterious consequences of the use of unskilled labour on manufacturing, targeting it as a major cause of the slowdown in productivity growth in the export-oriented industries.
Machinery (mainly electric-electronics products) has dominated manufactured exports from Malaysia over the period 1990 to 2008 (see table  7 ). No other industry recorded double-digit percentage share of manufactured export in 2008, demonstrating that the structure of exports have not changed significantly over the period 1990 to 2008. Because the electronics industry is still dominated by low-end assembly-type activities, its dominance in manufactured exports demonstrates that there has been little structural change to higher value-added activities in Malaysia. 37 Textile and garment exports fell over the period 1990 to 2005. Whereas the relative contraction in exports in the 1990s was a consequence of massive expansion in electric and electronics exports, the relative fall after 2000 was caused by the termination of the MFA and increased exports from China and least developed countries such as Cambodia.
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Productivity
Beverages, tobacco and basic metals were the only manufacturing industries to record improvements in labour productivity over the period 2005 to 2008 (see table 8 ). The productivity of food products, non-electrical machinery, electronics, textiles and garments, and transport equipment either shrunk or slowed down considerably in this period. Labour productivity of the electric-electronics industry grew at an annual average of 12.4 percent in 1990 to 1995 but fell to 7.9 percent in 1995 to 2000 and a mere 1.4 percent per annum in 2000 to 2005 and 0.3 percent in 2005 to 2008. There is considerable evidence of an expansion of local suppliers that benefited from dynamic changes in production strategies, especially those of American multinationals in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 39 The strong technological synergies offered by multinational corporations appear to have been undermined by a lack of effective rooting policies by the government for firms to upgrade to the technology frontier.
The number of electronics firms in Malaysia engaged in designing and R&D activities only constituted 1.0 percent of the total in 2007. 40 As the firms failed to evolve technological capabilities to designing and R&D activities in the face of rapid expansion in China and Vietnam, the supplier base began to contract from the late 1990s. 41 The lack of engineers and scientists in particular has been a glaring problem that has slowed down productivity growth in the industry. For example, in 2007, Malaysia only had 729 researchers per million people when there were 7,059 in Singapore and 6,028 in the Republic of Korea. Taken together, the evidence is overwhelming that manufacturing has started to fall in significance from 2000 with the contraction being the most serious in the period 2000 to 2009. Also of importance is that key manufacturing industries have faced a slowdown or a fall in trade performance and productivity since 2000. More importantly, the structure of manufacturing has not shown a significant shift to higher value-added industries over the period 1990 to 2008. The trends confirm that Malaysia has been facing negative deindustrialization since 2000.
Causes of Slow Industrial Upgrading
A number of reasons explain why Malaysia has been gripped by slow industrial upgrading, a trend which has caused negative deindustrialization since 2000, though the origin can be traced from the mid-1990s, when manufacturing began to absorb unskilled foreign labour. By far the most important reason is a lack of institutional change to stimulate technological upgrading in manufacturing. Despite the introduction of meso organizations since the introduction of APITD in 1990, the drive to engender the conditions essential for upgrading has been stifled by policies coloured by ethnic considerations. The path of connecting with multinationals through foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important route to break into global value chains and to develop resource-based industries. However, to break out from the middle-income group to achieve high-income status requires the strong participation of firms in high value-added activities. The meso organizations launched did not succeed in offering the high-tech infrastructure for upgrading, nor did they connect policy instruments with performing firms. Where Schumpeterian innovation rents were created it was dissipated without accountable performance standards.
Ethnic policies are partly responsible for sub-optimal allocations in Malaysia. The problem of ethnic colouration in government policy in industry was raised earlier by a number of authors who have argued that it has stifled the development of the real entrepreneurs. 44 Others have argued that government policy has discouraged Chinese business from participating in high value-added activities that are more risky. 45 The leadership of key meso organizations appears to have been determined by ethnic rather than purely experience-based considerations. For example, until 2010, the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Systems (MIMOS), the Malaysian Development Corporation and the Small and Medium-Scale Industries Corporation (SMIDEC) were led by experts without the comparable tacit knowledge of high-tech activities. In contrast, in Taiwan, experts such as Morris Chang and Wu Tae Yuan, who not only studied in big universities but also gained substantial tacit knowledge by holding high positions in multinationals in the United States, were recruited to run high-tech firms engaged in high value-added activities such as designing and R&D. Despite the introduction of brain gain policies in Malaysia since the 1990s, a similar approach to attract back Malaysian talent from abroad has not been successful because of ethnicbased policies.
Malaysia has faced a dissipation of Schumpeterian rents through a lack of accountable industry-government coordination efforts. In contrast, the infant firm in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, targeted with grants to support participation in high value-added activities, was subjected to stringent performance standards through ex ante vetting, monitoring and ex post appraisal. 46 The incubator framework that evolved so successfully in Japan, Korea and Taiwan to nurture newcomers in strategic industries through effective monitoring and ex post appraisal failed to produce internationally competitive firms in Malaysian manufacturing. Vetting became an important factor in the evaluation of R&D grants, but the lack of effective monitoring and ex post appraisal denied the country the institutional coordination required to ensure the transformation of the Schumpeterian rents into high value-added activities.
The lack of performance standards also explains why the national car manufacturers have yet to show high export-intensities since the first national cars rolled out of the factory in Malaysia in 1985. The governments in Japan and Korea not only transformed their national cars into winners in global markets in the early years through rents given in the form of subsidized credit, protection through tariffs and quotas and grants, but also reduced their participation in rentier activities by using stringent performance standards. In Malaysia, distributors also require a permit from the government to import cars from abroad. The national car industry in Malaysia continues to make most of its profits from the domestic market with a strong reliance on royalties paid for use of foreign technology to automakers abroad. The lack of sufficiently fast upgrading to expand exports may also be explained by the empirical evidence from a study in 2006, which shows that suppliers in liberalized Indonesia enjoyed higher technological capabilities than suppliers in Malaysia. 47 Yet, the leading role of the government in promoting Malaysian products through the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE) has offered a unique platform that national car exporters could have used to build their exports.
Malaysia's industrial policies rightly targeted upgrading to higher valueadded activities, which became more pronounced through the cluster approach taken by IMP 2 of 1996. While the IMP 2 identified high value-added industries for development to move to, the institutional mechanisms (regulatory framework) for guiding them sequentially to the technology frontier were not clarified for their effective implementation by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Since the mid-1990s MITI has vetted foreign investment applications in high value-added activities, as serious labour shortages drove the government to become selective . However, fears of a chronic economic downswing accompanying the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998 led to a relaxation of such monitoring. In addition, the concept of clusters was not appropriated exhaustively as complementary industries became separate parts of industry clusters rather than an integral whole. For example, textiles and garments, electronics and wood products began developing their own machinery firms rather than seeking to connect with a common pool of scope-based machinery firms to serve all of them.
Little institutional connectivity exists between industry and universities and other knowledge-based organizations to provide the technological synergies essential to support firms' participation in new process and product development. Universities in Malaysia have long operated as independent silos of knowledge creation and training without significant research and development links with industry. Participation in high value-added activities, whether through adding value to traditional industries or supporting new start-ups, requires effective collaboration between universities and R&D labs and firms. In contrast, universities became a critical component of the national and sectoral innovation systems in Japan, Korea and Taiwan to stimulate knowledge creation and diffusion. 48 Hence, the rate of reported commercialization of R&D undertaken by public universities did not reach even 1 percent of grants used in 2008. 49 The meso organizations, including universities, failed to significantly expand the share of researchers in the population. Hence, the share of researchers per million persons, and R&D expenditure in Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) of Malaysia have remained extremely low when compared to East Asian countries such as the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China, which have faced positive deindustrialization. For example, the share of researchers per million persons in 2006 to 2007 in China, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan was 1,071, 5,573, 4,627 and 6,088 and 4,159 compared to 372 in Malaysia. 50 The lack of a critical mass of human capital has been pointed out by electronics firms to be a major factor inhibiting upgrading, 51 which has been exacerbated by the government focus on importing unskilled foreign labour into manufacturing since the 1990s. Instead of using the supply-side pressures arising from labour shortages to force firms to innovate and a move into higher value-added activities within existing industries, and to structurally shift to higher value-added industries by making production more capital-and knowledge-intensive, firms simply started importing cheap unskilled foreign labour. The impact of such a policy has been counterproductive as it has removed the pressure on firms to upgrade into higher value-added activities.
In Japan, Korea and Taiwan, mechanisms were evolved to effectively vet ex ante, monitor and appraise ex post all technology transfer transactions between foreign suppliers and local firms. In contrast, the technology transfer unit (TTU) that was established at MITI in 1975 has only played a static role in confining its function to registration in Malaysia. A board comprising Malaysian experts from industry but especially individuals with tacit knowledge acquired working in globally renowned labs and multinationals should be tapped to strengthen the regulatory framework used to stimulate creative destruction and creative accumulation activities in the manufacturing sector. This body should be made independent and accountable so as to provide the insulation essential from powerful interest groups.
Eclectic government policies can also be blamed for the lack of technological upgrading into high value-added activities in Malaysia. 52 For example, in electronics manufacturing the Malaysian government invested considerably to support the introduction of wafer fabrication from the 1990s, but chose not to support upgrading in its plants of Silterra and 1st Silicon from four-inch 0.13 sub-micron technology fabrication to twelve-inch nanotechnology fabrication. Also, there have been no initiatives to stimulate the expansion of designing firms, which are the firms that enjoy the highest rate of returns in the industry. In contrast, the Taiwan government systematically saw to the upgrading of wafer fabrication technology to twelveinch wafers by 2000. 53 
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The evidence produced in the paper is concrete enough to suggest that Malaysia is indeed facing negative deindustrialization since the late 1990s. While it is typically part of structural change for manufacturing's share in GDP to rise and fall as economies grow, positive deindustrialization is associated with continued strong growth in exports and productivity. Not only has the trade performance of the sector in Malaysia been falling, manufacturing labour productivity has also slowed down with the key sectors, such as electric-electronics, textiles and transport equipment, showing either negative or very low productivity growth since 2000.
The evolutionary and heterodox advocates of industrial policy have argued that government intervention is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for driving industrial upgrading. The Malaysian government intervened strongly but unevenly in the manufacturing sector, offering robust incentives and indirect subsidies to export-oriented industries such as electricelectronics and textiles and clothing and protection and direct subsidies to the import-substitution industries such as steel and automobiles. There were also strong industrial policy blueprints launched-particularly the IMP 1 of 1986 and the IMP 2 of 1996, and several important organizations were created to stimulate technological upgrading. By the late 1990s industrial deepening strategies in the country have run aground as export performance and labour productivity growth either contracted or slowed down considerably.
Whereas global developments such as the 1997-98 financial crisis and the termination of the MFA in 2004 were outside Malaysia's control the history of industrialization shows that only countries that achieved technological progress within a globally competitive framework have managed to engender and appropriate synergies from long-term growth and structural change. The emergence of China, India and Vietnam has limited Malaysia's manufacturing sector to appropriate creative destruction synergies through the cheapening of production, organizational and logistics costs and speeding up of deliveries. Ineffective linkages between the knowledge production centres of universities and R&D labs with firms have restricted the capacity of firms to participate in creative destruction and creative accumulation activities to assist them to compete with firms in more developed countries that are engaged in new product development. The Malaysian evidence also shows that ethnic policies may hinder rather than help industrial upgrading to higher value-added activities, as capable leaders, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds, are a sine qua non to effectively captain the intermediary organizations connecting and coordinating government policy instruments horizontally with firms.
Four policy implications should be drawn from this paper, none of which require the launching of more organizations and expenditure outlays to support knowledge adapting and creating activities. There are already too many organizations in Malaysia with enormous budgets to undertake such activities. First, it is important to connect the meso organizations with the firms, particularly local firms, and then impose performance standards alongside effective accounting instruments. It is necessary to establish a framework for orientating universities, intermediary organizations and firms (and other economic agents) towards the commercialization of research and development.
Second, there must be a mechanism for vetting ex ante, monitoring and appraising ex post technology transfer agreements with foreign technology suppliers. 54 A board comprised of Malaysian experts from industry but especially individuals with tacit knowledge acquired working in globally renowned labs and multinationals should be tapped to strengthen the regulatory framework used to stimulate creative destruction and creative accumulation activities in the manufacturing sector. This body should be made independent and accountable so as to provide the insulation essential from powerful interest groups.
Third, the provision of grants to support R&D should be stepped up. However, consistent with policy frameworks in Japan, Korea and Taiwan during the catch-up phase, the body assembled to coordinate the provision of grants should go beyond vetting to monitor and appraise ex post effectively all grants targeted at supporting knowledge-based public goods. This was the framework that the pioneering MITI 55 of Japan initiated through incubation that evolved successfully, in different forms, in Korea and Taiwan. This body should also be insulated from powerful interest groups but must be made accountable for its evaluations. Given the strong rooting and enabler properties of the integrated circuits industry, the government should strengthen rather than abandon the development of the industry. The policy focus should include the use of incubators with strong links to universities, R&D labs and firms but one that is led by human capital with tacit knowledge of technology and markets. Clearly a critical mass of firms must move up towards the technology frontier for Malaysian manufacturing to reverse its current premature deindustrialization trend.
Fourth, it is important to target human capital upgrading in the country through the use of two strategies. The first of these requires the stepping up of both the quantity and quality of high-tech education in the country to raise the numbers of engineers, researchers and scientists per million persons. We pointed out earlier that Malaysia lacks a critical mass of such experts to undertake knowledge-based activities in the country. The second should use human capital abroad with tacit knowledge as an important source of foreign expertise. The existing brain gain program must be revised to instill nationalistic elements that offer equal status to all Malaysians irrespective of ethnicity and to address the scholastic and experiential qualifications of experts when appointing them to run start-ups and meso organizations. In the short run, this strategy should be complemented with the introduction of permanent resident cards for scarce foreign talent, with a more efficient approval process. In addition, the government should introduce levies to regulate the use of unskilled foreign labour, attracting instead skilled and professional labour to support industrial upgrading in Malaysia.
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